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Inherent Instability: Disproving
Luttwak's Thesis of Defense
in Depth
BY ADAM STILGOE
...-.-.. his paper is chiefly designed to illustrate the fourth century
Roman defense in depth model of border protection with regard
to the Eastern part of the Roman empire. While several models
ofdefense in depth with regard to the Roman Empire exist, I have
chosen to utilize Edward Luttwak's book The Grand Strategy ofthe Roman Empire
as representative of Eastern Roman defense in depth during Constantius' and
Julian's reign from 353 to 363 C.E. 1 I have paid particular regard to fortifications
and the use of artillery, as they are most often mentioned in Ammianus
Marcellinus's surviving histories and other primary source documents and are
integral pieces of an effective border defense. The second part of this essay is a
critique of Luttwak's description of Roman border defense through the lens of
primary source documents, as his thesis and the texts of ancient authors differ
in several key points. In particular, Constantine's movement of troops from the
borders to a mobile, standing army is misrepresented in Luttwak's work and
needs to be corrected.
Luttwak's thesis on Roman border defenses offers two examples of standard
Roman practice in the East, and elsewhere. The Western borders are a topic in
their own right that will not be addressed in this paper. There were two kinds
of defense available to the Roman emperors during the latter half of the fourth
century: an elastic defense and a defense in depth.2 An elastic defense had no
fortified perimeter; instead the defense relied on mobile forces, comprised of both
infantry and cavalry that could meet the offense head on, as long as the defense was
at least as mobile as the offense.3 This strategy acquired the benefit of not needing
to assign troops to hold fortifications, and therefore not needing to send troops
stationed at peaceful borders elsewhere in case ofa military emergency; conversely,
it sacrificed the inherent advantages ofdefending a fOrtified, fixed position, although
the defense could still defend territory that it knew relatively welL4
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"The defense in depth model is slightly more complex.
It is based on ~self contained strongholds with mobile
forces either between or behind them,~ whereby the mobile
forces in reserve and the fortifications act in concert.s If
the strongholds could successfully withstand the offense
without requiring assistance of the mobile reserve, if the
mobile elements did not need the for£ified areas to survive
an encounter with the enemy, and if the invading army
needed to destroy the fortified areas to continue, then it was
a successful use of the defense in depth military method.6
Not only cities would be fortified; granaries, villas, lowns,
villages, and defensive positions all acquired fortifications in
which townsfolk or whatever bands of soldiers were handy
could defend themselves; food could also be stored in such
enclosures and supply lines and roads could be protected
through the use of this fortification system.? Mention in
a surviving document pertaining to Constantius' actions
regarding the supplying of forts and fortified towns in Syria
is also made, stating that, ~The cities of Syria you stocked
with engines of war, garrisons, food supplies, and equipment
of other kinds, considering that ...you would ... sufficiently
protect the inhabitants.~8 An invading army would find its
supply lines cut off by bands of roving soldiers that had taken
shelter in fortified camps or towns and were now ravaging
the army's rear; if the army ceased moving towards the
interior and attempted to deal with the city it lost valuable
time, supplies, and men, in turn giving the mobile Roman
army time to counterattack as it marched from its position
somewhere along the Mediterranean, generally at or near
Italy.9 The existence of extensive fortifications also allowed
the mobile reserves to retreat behind high walls in the face
of defeat, and for intelligence to be gathered about enemy
movements from the rear. III
Because fortifications played such an important role
in the defense of the Roman Empire their improvement
became mandatory as time went on. After the end of the
third century Roman forts began to take on characteristics
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that made them distinct from their predecessors. First, forts
began to be built on different sites; rather than attempting to
merely look impressive, forts were constructed less for ease
of travel (i.e. near roads) but instead for tactical dominance. ll
In particular, there was a concern for easily defensible
terrain; forts were often placed on hills, or near areas that
were otherwise easily defensible, with rivers being a chief
commodity in fort building. 12 Forts also acquired different
shapes; instead of the older rectangular shaped forts with
a circular ditch defense, forts became irregularly shaped
quadrilaterals or ovals, or squared, with the advantage
becoming that of a shorter distance for soldiers to move
about the top of the wa1l 13• Walls were thickened, as were
ditches, to keep battering rams and other siege engines away
from the walls.It
Luttwak's explanation for the sudden increased
effectiveness of Roman fortifications goes against what he
says is "sometimes suggested~15. He believes that fortifications
were not improved because the armies threatening Rome
suddenly developed better siege equipment, but were instead
produced precisely because the armies threatening Rome had
not produced such equipment at all.16 It should be noted that
his primary interest is in the barbarian armies of the West,
and reference is made to the Persian armies having advanced
their siege making technology, although little more is said
than that they had it.17
Another chief component of the defense of Roman
fortifications is that of artillery. Artillery was no longer part
of a Roman legion's auxiliary forces but was instead placed in
fortified areas to help with defense. 18 Luttwak suggests that
with the formation of wider ditches came the use of artillery
to keep attackers away from the walls; with the attacking army
stranded on the wrong side ofthe ditch ballistae and catapults
could rain fire down upon them at will. 19 Artillery, according
to Luttwak's model. was designed to "hold the attackers in an
outer zone that could be covered by overlapping missile fire~
and "could not be sharply angled, [and] their fire could not be
directed down at attackers close to the walls~
The final component of Luttwak's thesis that needs to
be addressed is his depiction of Constantine's removal of
provincial garrisons to supply a mobile Roman field army
that could come to the rescue of embattled garrisons in
the East. ~lt is apparent,~ he states, "that reductions made
in the provincial forces that guarded the frontiers in order
to strengthen the central field armies ... must inevitably
have downgraded the day-to-day security of the common
people."ll Luttwak draws this conclusion that "Diocletian...
created or expanded the sacer comitatus... , replacing the
improvised field forces of their predecessors with standing
field armies and creating the dual structure of static border
troops...and field forces ... that characterized the army of the
late empire: and that Constantine merely refined this method
of defense.%! He goes on to say that the stationing of the
II Part/tica near Rome and the three Severan legions being
commanded by the equestrian class made the foundation of
this new "central field army~ less of a military construction
and more of a political one.n This force was substantially
increased by Constantine's time, with 23,000 men out of up
to 30,000 being ready for active campaigning, leaving only
seven thousand for border defense.'U Constantine increased
the size of the field army, but as there were no new resources
for the empire to draw from, it seems likely that these troops
were taken from provincial garrisons.25 This leads Luttwak to
the aforementioned conclusion that the safety of the empire
was drastically reduced because of troops being moved from
fortifications in the defense in depth model to stations within
a mobile field army used primarily to keep the emperor in
power and only secondarily as a military too!, a move for
which Luttwak feels Constantine is "rightly criticized"16. By
the time of Constantius, with which this paper is primarily
concerned, the defense in depth was so deep that only Italy
could rightly claim to be held, and then only because the
mobile reserve was deployed there; everything else was a
network of fortifications designed to slow down the enemy
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while the mobile reserve, mainly cavalry, could march to
meet them.Z7
During the invasions ofShapur II Ammianus Mercellinus
recorded the military movements on the Eastern front at
the time, with particular regard to several fortified cities
and towns and the devastating effect Shapur's army had
upon them. These descriptions of events also detail how
well the defense in depth model worked at the time. The
first town in his path was Singara, "abundantly fortified
with soldiers and with all necessities: a fact which seems to
contradict the idea of garrisons being fatally weakened by
the formation ofa larger mobile reserve, at least in the minds
of the Roman intelligentsia.'lS Upon the sighting of Shapur's
army, the defenders retreat inside Singara, but strangely "full
of courage ran to the various towers and battlements and got
together stones and engines of war~lf In order for a defense
in depth model to be successful, the attacker needs to deal
with a fortification, buying time for the mobile army to
counterattack. Yet it seems strange that Shapur II, fresh outof
Persia with an enormous army, should attack the first heavily
defended fortified town he sees, especially one defended
valiantly by "townsmen.~JO The casualties were heavy on both
sides. The town housed two of the smaller legions of the
time, the First Flavian and the First Parthian, yet "the greater
part of the army was in camp guarding Nisibis, which was
a very long distance off... [and] all the surrounding country
was dried up from lack of water."JI This implies three things.
Firstly, should Shapur II have left the defenders of Singara
behind him, it is unlikely that he would have to fear an attack
in his rear, as it was guarded by a desolate wasteland where no
water was to be found, thus eliminating one major advantage
of the defense in depth model. Secondly, if the greater part
of the Roman army was at Nisibis, in light of the defense in
depth model it makes little sense for Shapur II to waste such
a significant part of his manpower taking a city that, as has
been said, posed little threat to his rear, while a much larger
and more dangerous force was still in front of him. Finally,
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the Roman fortifications seem to have had little effect upon
the Persian military. Ammianus claims that the Persian ram's
effectiveness was largely due to its ~penetrating the joints of
the new laid stones, which were still moist and therefore
weak W where the city had been breached previously.» But
the first breach of the walls occurred in 348 C.E., and Shapur
II's invasion was twelve years later; it seems unlikely, then,
that the walls would still be so freshly made that a ram
would have such an easy time of bringing them down.D This
lends credence to the idea that Shapur II's army had siege
equipment that Roman fortifications couldn't handle, either
because the fortifications were faulty themselves or the
Persians had developed siege equipment superior to them,
a theory that will be explored later following several other
primary source documents.
The next city to be attacked was Bezabde. a ~very strong
fortress" that was situated on a relatively large hill and
next to the banks of the Tigris river.34 This fort had a wide
trench and a double wall where it was most vulnerable to
assault by enemy siege engines and infantry.35 Bezabde was
equipped with artillery as well, in lieu of its importance as
a military fortification.J6 The Persians do not seem to have
been deterred by the ditches, as their archers were able to
move close enough to the fortress to rain arrows down on
the defenders as they prepared to repulse the attackers.37
However, despite the close proximity of the archers, the
defending artillery wreaked havoc among the attacking forces
regardless of their positioning. even driving off siege engines
perilously close to the walls.38 This goes against Luttwak's
thesis that artillery was only useful when the enemy was
on the other side of the ditch or ditches surrounding the
fort, and instead was effective against the enemy no matter
where they were. Again the Persians succeed in taking
Bezabde through the use of a ram, and again Ammianus
mentions extenuating circumstances, with a Christian priest
supposedly conveying to Shapur Ii information concerning
where the walls were weakest.39 Though he claims to have
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his doubts, Ammianus doesn't specifically deny this rumor.40
lending further suspicion of the effectiveness of Roman
fortifications and the superiority of Persian siege engines.
The ditches and double wall seem to have had little to no
effect, and the Persian army, though doubtless exhausted
from the long journey from Singara and anxious about
the closing winter season4l seems to have had tittle trouble
rampaging unchecked through Roman territory; no mention
of harassment tactics concerning the Persian supply lines is
made, and the mobile Roman army is conspicuously absent
from the proceedings. In the East, then, the Roman defense
in depth model seems so far to be a failure.
With the death ofConstantius Julian took the throne and
in 363 C.E. invaded Persia with the mobile field army, only
a few years since Shapur II's invasion of Roman territory
in Mesopotamia. He assembled the army and "hastened
to invade the enemy's country, outstripping the report of
his coming."42 Upon the Roman army's arrival in Assyria
they confronted the Persian fortress of Anatha, captured it
through the Persian's surrender, and burned it to the ground
immediately afterwards.u This tactic is repeated several
times, with several abandoned forts and a major fortress,
Pirisabora, all being captured and burned to the ground,
and their populace taken away as slaves.+! Maiozamalcha
is also captured and destroyed45, and the capturing and
burning of fortifications and cities continues until Julian is
defeated at Ctesiphon.'16 The Chronicon Ps.-Dionysianum
says that, "Julian descended into Persia and devastated
the entire region from Nisibus as far as Ctesiphon in Bet
Aramaye. He took a large number of captives from there.~41
Eutropius also mentions that "Several towns and fortresses
of the Persians he induced to surrender, and some he took by
storm... [He laid] waste to Assyria."48 Julian's army and
methods of attack were remembered in several places,
then, as being incredibly destructive and thorough;
nothing of any military or civilian value, it seems,
was left intact.
At this point Julian and his army were deep inside Persian
territory. The role of Luttwak's mobile reserve army in the
defense in depth model plays litlle part here. Instead of a
reactionary tool designed to repel invaders and to secure the
embattled frontier zone, the mobile reserve instead takes
the fight to the Persians, assaulting towns, cities, and forts
with equal vigor in an effort to literally wipe out areas of
possible resistance. Soldiers and townsfolk are slaughtered
or taken prisoner and sent west, and the forts themselves,
rather than being saved for Roman use, are destroyed, to be
used by neither side. Luttwak's statement that Constantine
is Mrightly criticized- for weakening border defenses seems
amiss in light of Ammianus' histories. The townsfolk of
Bezabde. Singara. and other perimeter fortresses seem to
have been able defenders, taking a heavy toll on Shapuc Irs
army, and the defense in depth model seems to dash with the
preferred method of Persian warfare. Rather than ignoring
the fortified towns and smaller fortresses in his path. Shapur
systematically destroys all of them, just as the Romans did
when Julian invaded several years later. As Blockley puts it,
Constantine's adoption of a major mobile reserve is not to
be criticized but instead should be seen as ~an instrument
of a policy that was militarily and politically aggressive" his
strategy that of Ma harder counterstrike into enemy territory
as a prelude to a settlement."~ Julian obviously used the
same basic strategy of destroying enemy assets in Persia to
assure compliance with Roman wishes, though the outcome
was not entirely favorable to the Romans in the end.so
J7
Luttwak's thesis, then, with regard to the East, is not
fundamentally sound. Shapur II and Persia's armies in
general cannot be said to have found Roman fortifications
intimidating, even when they were heavily improved,
as in Bezabde. Likewise artillery, though only used in
defensive emplacements, was not restricted to keeping the
attackers beyond the defensive ditch found at many Roman
fortifications, but instead could and did fire upon attackers
and siege equipment very dose to the walls. The mobile
reserve was not mobile enough to support defense in depth
in the East. Shapur II invaded, sacked two cities, and nearly
had time to annihilate a third, while Constantius mustered
his troops. While a defense in depth model attributes
success to an attacker having to annihilate fortifications,
the Roman defense of Mesopotamia during Shapur II's
invasion can hardly be called successful. Likewise it seems
fortifications behind Shapur II's lines had very little effect in
terms of defensive strategy, as Ammianus' works seem to
suggest. And most importantly, the criticism of the mobile
field army being increased at the diminishment of the border
defenses seems to be entirely unfounded when the army
itself is regarded not merely as a military tool but also as
a political and diplomatic one. While Luttwak's thesis has
many strong points, its overall defense brings to mind the
rotted walls of Singara. Several key elements are founded on
faulty evidence which render the entire fortification, if you
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